BAGHDAD
— One Iraqi general is known as “chicken guy” because of his
reputation for selling his soldiers’ poultry provisions. Another is
“arak guy,” for his habit of enjoying that anis-flavored liquor on the
job. A third is named after Iraq’s 10,000-dinar bills, “General Deftar,” and is infamous for selling officer commissions.
They
are just a few of the faces of the entrenched corruption of the Iraqi
security forces, according to Iraqi officers and lawmakers as well as
American officials.
The
Iraqi military and police forces had been so thoroughly pillaged by
their own corrupt leadership that they all but collapsed this spring in
the face of the advancing militants of the Islamic State — despite
roughly $25 billion worth of American training and equipment over the
past 10 years and far more from the Iraqi treasury.
Now
the pattern of corruption and patronage in the Iraqi government forces
threatens to undermine a new American-led effort to drive out the
extremists, even as President Obama is doubling to 3,000 the number of
American troops in Iraq.
The
United States has insisted that the Iraqi military act as the conduit
for any new aid and armaments being supplied for a counteroffensive,
including money and weapons intended for tribal fighters willing to push
out the Islamic State. In its 2015 budget, the Pentagon has requested $1.3 billion to provide weapons for the government forces and $24.1 million intended for the tribes.
But
some of the weaponry recently supplied by the army has already ended up
on the black market and in the hands of Islamic State fighters,
according to Iraqi officers and lawmakers. American officials directed
questions to the Iraqi government.
“I
told the Americans, don’t give any weapons through the army — not even
one piece — because corruption is everywhere, and you will not see any
of it,” said Col. Shaaban al-Obeidi of the internal security forces,
also a Sunni tribal leader in Anbar Province. “Our people will steal
it.”
Iraqi
officers and lawmakers, some speaking on the condition of anonymity
because they are not authorized to speak to the media, say that army and
police payrolls are still wildly inflated by “ghost soldiers,” either
conjured entirely by a superior officer or just splitting a paycheck
with a patron instead of showing up for work.
And
Iraqi soldiers often charge that they have been furnished with partial
supplies and cheaply made weapons because their commanders took
kickbacks or skimmed off the savings.
“If
each soldier is supposed to get 100 bullets, he will only get 50, and
the officer will take and sell the rest,” Colonel Obeidi said. As he
showed a reporter the Austrian-made Glock handgun he obtained from
United States forces years ago, he added, “If the Iraqi Army had
supplied this, the barrel would explode in two rounds.”
As
the United States invests in battling the Islamic State, the waste and
graft within the Iraqi forces may play a critical role in the outcome,
according to current Iraqi officials and American officers with
experience here.
Many
Sunni tribal leaders, deeply mistrustful of the Shiite-dominated
military, are urging the United States to provide salaries and weapons
directly to the tribes, much as it did during the so-called Awakening movement against Al Qaeda in Iraq seven years before.
But
officials of the Shiite-dominated government say any American attempts
to work directly with the tribes would violate Iraqi sovereignty and
exacerbate sectarian divisions.
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American officials say working with the tribes, and military corruption, is beyond the scope of their mission. “Reducing
corruption is not part of the advisers’ role,” said one American
official involved in the effort, “and there is no reason to believe that
advisers’ presence will reduce corruption.”
Veterans
of past American operations in Iraq say that by working closely with
Iraqi battalions, the advisers could help reduce the military’s troubles
with kickbacks, inflated payrolls and other graft. But it is unclear
how large a deployment that would require. Mr. Obama recently authorized
doubling the number of troops in Iraq.
To
increase accountability, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi is trying to
require that each tribal fighter sign for the serial number of any new
weapon, said his spokesman, Rafid Jaboori. But Iraq military officers
would implement those procedures.
Mr.
Abadi recently purged 36 top officers he accused of corruption and
unprofessionalism. He was also consolidating his power: all were also
officers considered personally loyal to his predecessor and rival, Nuri
Kamal al-Maliki. Like Mr. Maliki, Mr. Abadi named his own new generals
in violation of the Constitution, which requires parliamentary approval.
Among
those removed was Lt. Gen. Rashid Fleih, the chief of operations in
Anbar Province, known as “chicken guy.” Gen. Sabah al-Fatlawi, known as
“the arak guy” and the brother of a close Maliki ally, was removed as
military chief for the city of Samarra. Gen. Hatem al-Magsusi, a chief
of military intelligence known for publicizing terrorism cases against
Mr. Maliki’s political rivals, was dismissed as well.
Gen.
Mahdi al-Gharawi, also known as “Deftar,” was removed shortly after the
humiliating rout of his forces from Mosul in June. He had been the
subject of longstanding charges of torture by Human Rights Watch.
None
of the allegations against the generals have been proved in a court,
and all four declined to comment or could not be reached.
But
Iraqi lawmakers say part of the military’s problem is that very few, if
any, charges have been brought against any Iraqi officer over the last
11 years, even as the perception of corruption has grown.
The
government’s corruption watchdog reported to the prime minister, and
this arrangement became known as a political tool to punish the prime
minister’s enemies.
As a result, the only measure of the corruption is the amount of money wasted without discernible result.
“Corruption
in the military is real terrorism,” said Salah Hamid al-Mutlaq, a Sunni
lawmaker who sits on Parliament’s defense committee, “and it is even
more dangerous.”
No
one pretends the corruption is limited to a few dozen generals. “Only a
few of the top officers have no corruption,” said Amer Tau’ma, a
lawmaker in the dominant Shiite bloc who is also on the defense
committee.
Buying
officer titles, shaking down civilians and siphoning money from
inflated payrolls are all “a continuous phenomenon,” said Talal
al-Zubai, a lawmaker from a Sunni party who sits on the
government-ethics committee. Dismissing the generals was insufficient,
he argued.
“They
should be executed. They destroyed Iraq,” he said. “For the American
advisers, there is no chance their mission will succeed with lying Iraqi
commanders.”
United
States military officers insist that they left the Iraqi Army in
relatively good form when they began to withdraw in 2009. Their close
observation during the five previous years had helped keep a lid on the
graft, they said.
“You
could clean up the ‘ghost soldier’ problem,” said Joel Rayburn, an Army
colonel who worked closely with the Iraqi military and now teaches at
the National Defense University. “If an Iraqi brigade or regiment is
supposed to have 700 guys but there are only 250, that is easy to
notice.”
The
police force was different. “It was much harder to get a handle on the
inflated numbers,” he said, “where you have fake names, or people who
never came to work and split their salaries with whoever had gotten them
hired.”
Then,
as the United States began reducing its numbers of troops in Iraq in
2009, Mr. Maliki began to reach deep into the Iraqi ranks to personally
direct officer appointments and to dispense political patronage.
“As
Maliki and his allies exerted greater and greater control of the Iraqi
armed forces, they really milked it for the money that was going into
it,” Mr. Rayburn said, adding that they would say, “ ‘You want a command
or you want your son to go to the military academy? Well, here is how
much it is going to cost.’ ”Iraqi lawmakers say connections granted
impunity.
“If
you want to punish an officer for what he stole, you find he has
political protection within the government and you can’t do anything to
get him,” said Mr. Tau’ma, of the Parliament’s defense committee. “It
has a demoralizing effect when the soldier who takes all the risk
against the Islamic State — and sometimes doesn’t get enough support for
months — sees his commandertaking all the money.”
Omar Al Jawoshy contributed reporting.
source; newyork times news
source; newyork times news